Having discovered a rekindled love for both blogging, and Michel Foucault, I have come across a paper I wrote a number of years ago, contrasting the Ferguson Riots, Missouri, USA, with the Apartheid regime in South Africa, in light of Foucault’s concept of power.
Have a read, enjoy, discuss. Adam x
“Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere… it is permanent repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing… power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” – M Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will To Knowledge (1998).
“I was not a messiah, but an ordinary man who had become a leader because of extraordinary circumstances.” In accordance with the one year anniversary of Nelson Mandela’s death, this paper will assess the power/law relationship as discussed by Michel Foucault in the context of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, particularly the prisoners of Robben Island Prison, and compare the more recent Ferguson Riots in Missouri, USA, and the ‘complex strategical situation’ to arise as a result of both instances. In using the above case studies, I aim to demonstrate how the law is indeed concerned with power, particularly disciplinary power. While this initially looks to conform with Foucault’s train of thought, I do agree that the law has to some extent been displaced by disciplinary powers, though do not accept that the law is wholly repressive, the reasons for which will be alluded to throughout the paper.
In order to competently answer the question posed, biographical context of Michel Foucault as well as definitions of power, law, resistance and counter-conduct will precede the crux of the paper, i.e. the power/law relationship and the role of resistance and counter-conduct in said relationship.
Michel Foucault (1926-1984), born in Portiers, France, is an individual whose title causes as much debate as each of his major works. Often described as post-structuralist, Foucault himself rejected this label, preferring to analyse its significance rather than identify himself as such. Instead, Foucault considered himself an historian of systems of thought; though will be presented as a philosopher for the sake of this paper.
Foucault wrote of how his earlier writings were not intended to analyse the phenomena of power, but to instead create a history of the different means in which human beings are made subjects. While his works were indeed based on the theme of human subjectivity, he understood that the human as a subject is consequently placed within power structures complex in nature, and so the theme of power became interlaced throughout his work.
My discourse is obviously that of an intellectual, and as such it functions within the existing networks of power. But a book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer. The more new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier I shall be. All of my books are, if you like, little tool-boxes. If people want to open them, to use this sentence or that idea… to short-circuit, discredit or smash systems of power… so much the better.’
In looking at the subjectivity of man, his work can be dissected into three distinct strands: subjectivity through the development of linguistics, biology and economics; ‘dividing practices’ which demonstrate how the individual has become divided from others, through insanity, ill-health or criminality; and finally how individuals within society have come to consider themselves subjects of their own sexuality.
Writing about the subject in Discipline and Punish, Foucault was exploring how power infiltrates knowledge as a consequence of the surveillance and control of people; whilst in History of Sexuality Vol. 1 Foucault wished to classify desire so as to require its study and control. Both of these texts from the mid-1970s will be frequently referred to, to discuss Foucault’s position on law and its relationship with power, as well as alluding to his other works such as a series of interviews, lectures and essays.
Foucault and Law
Law in its most etymological understanding, is ‘the system of rules which a particular country or community recognises as regulating the actions of its members and which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties.’
It is difficult to find documented what precisely Foucault says about the law, having never written extensively on the study of legal forms in the same way he did in regards to the prison, asylum or sexuality. His position is not that of a legal positivist, insofar as the law is not an independent, institutionalised mode of rule application. Nor does his philosophy associate with natural law, rejecting the belief that the law has an all-important moral dimension. Foucault’s concept of the law is in fact related to its demise, and how it has been overtaken by the less restrictive disciplinary and bio-powers; law as the instrument and accessory of external powers. Golder and Fitzpatrick, whose stance I share, contends that while Foucault convincingly reduces the remit of the law, this reduction can never be total.
Foucault’s attitude towards law and sovereignty is associated with what has been coined the ‘expulsion thesis’. The manner in which law remains serves only to facilitate powers of modernity, ‘no more than a rubber stamp that sanctions the functioning of the disciplinary system.’ Foucault’s expulsion thesis has its origins in his critique of the ‘juridico-discursive’ notion of power. The historical and societal stigma associated with sexuality, discussed in The History of Sexuality, is equally present in terms of the law; both of which are suppressed by a juridico-discursive conception of power placing each in a ‘binary system’: separating licit from illicit, permitted and forbidden.
Underlying both the general theme that power represses sex and the idea that the law constitutes desire, one encounters the same putative mechanics of power.
Power seen through a juridico-discursive lens is ‘a law which says no’, and Foucault’s denunciation of said concept is a ‘stepping stone towards the idea that the analysis of power is better done without the mention of law.’ The ‘juridico-discursive’ model of power limits the analysis of law and power by centralising legal institutions and the state. Conversely, Foucault conceptualised power as multiple and decentralised, and as productive of social structures and knowledge. Law is merely considered an element in the expansion of power.
However, the law, as I have already contended, will never be usurped in its entirety by disciplinary powers but rather they go so far as to develop one another. By exercising its supervisory role over the abuses and excesses of disciplinary powers, the law consequently holds said powers to account, ensuring they achieve their primary goal of maintaining social order. It is in circumstances where disciplinary powers appear excessive that they are susceptible to the remit of the law, due to the inability of disciplinary powers to adapt responsively to certain situations.
The existence of law and disciplinary powers begs the question whether they can be resisted or countered by society.
Resistance and Counter-Conduct
Counter-conduct presents the other side of Michel Foucault’s view of power as governmentality, the ‘art of governing and being governed’. Governmentality can be appropriately considered the ‘conduct of conduct’, insofar as it is the regulation (conduct) of the behaviour (conduct) of individuals. Consequently, counter-conduct is the response to conducting power, as ‘where there is power there is resistance.’ In this respect, the relationship between power and resistance is a continuum rather than a relationship between opposites. The difference between resistance and counter-conduct is simply a development in vocabulary in order to more accurately reflect what Foucault meant by resistance to conducting power. In 1978, Foucault moved towards a language more closely concerned with counter-conduct which he believed went further in describing the struggle against the dominant order. While this paper uses the terms resistance and counter-conduct interchangeably, both are to be understood in the more accurate 1978 definition.
This paper will look at resistance and counter conduct in the context of the black community of South Africa throughout the Apartheid regime, and the manner in which the prisoners on Robben Island challenged dominant order in both public and private arenas. Analysis will then follow on to draw any comparisons between the Robben prisoners, and the participants in the Ferguson riots.
Race, Power and Space
Foucault’s work is somewhat lacking in regards to the concept of race, but with Apartheid forming the basis of this paper, race understandably becomes a primary concern. In accordance with the theme of race, comes the intuitive topic of racial difference which has entailed exploitation, enslavement and genocide throughout history. Foucault’s analysis of power indicates that power is not the result of an invisible hand, but rather is an active practice amongst individuals with individual capacities. Power demonstrates a relationship of influence, but in order for power to be present in said relationship, both agents must have the capacity to act differently. However, Foucault’s analysis of power is limited in describing its application in regards to the history of racist oppression, and in fact goes further in rejecting slavery as an example of a power relationship: “slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance to escape… [otherwise] it is a question of a physical relationship of constraint”. Though a relationship of constraint does not satisfactorily describe the instances of racism witnessed in South Africa throughout the Apartheid regime, or throughout the United States which remains prevalent today.
In lectures delivered at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, Foucault made reference to the theme of racism for the first time and how it affects the conception of power. Imperative to these lectures, and the theme of racism, was the distinction made between different sorts of power throughout history. The first was the power exhibited by the sovereign as a ‘right to life and death’ over their subjects (the right ‘to take life or let live’). Throughout the nineteenth century, this power progressed into what Foucault termed a ‘right to make live and to let die,’ with death no longer being celebrated as a method of punishment, becoming a more private occurrence. However, the strand of power most relevant to the theme of state racism is ‘biopower’, which ‘inscribes racism in the mechanisms of the state.’ Biopower, an affiliation of disciplinary power, establishes a hierarchy within society based upon biological distinctions, and labels ‘certain races good, and others, by contrast, are denounced as inferior’. With biopower, a new biopolitics would create institutions, disciplines and regulatory control to embody and enable the production and management of life.
In the context of South Africa’s regime of Apartheid, 1948-1994, National Party governments in South Africa developed a policy of structurally racialised discrimination, imposing hierarchies resulting in the white supremacy of Afrikaners, the colonial descendants of Dutch and French colonisers, over the black South African demographic. It was the instruments of control and humiliation, examples of law and disciplinary powers (racially discriminatory laws, administration boards, commissions of inquiry, town planning schemes, health regulations, police raids) and sites of regulation and surveillance (registration offices, health clinics, court rooms) that delineated South African society during the Apartheid regime. In this regard, Apartheid looks to fall within the realm of biopower. However, where biopower and sovereignty become distinct entities is relatively ambivalent. Sovereignty is distinguished from biopower in that it is rule of law, the power to judge, to condemn to die, and to pardon. Biopower by comparison, is the power to control life, to produce and shape it in a particular way through disciplinary constraints. Based on these definitions it would appear Apartheid makes a case at exhibiting both biopower and sovereignty, attributing biopower to the rule of law. Conversely, it could be argued that the laws which were intrinsic to the Apartheid regime were merely an element in the expansion of biopower, once again demonstrating the manner in which law and disciplinary powers work in cohesion (albeit, not necessarily achieving a desirable outcome).
Disciplinary Power, the Body and Space
The concept of biopower is closely associated with the disciplinary power discussed in Discipline in Punish. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault looked closely at the birth of the modern prison system, which drew parallels with the concept of the asylum in Madness and Civilisation, which together analysed the concept of space and the requirement of confinement in a modern society. Planned confinement of this sort falls under the term coined by Foucault, disciplinary space, which he argued extends far beyond the prison and asylum but into everyday life. The knowledge of what is right and wrong, licit and illicit is subconsciously embedded in daily activities through the observation and control from the outside, with said knowledge acting as confinement in a manner similar to the prison system.
‘Internal space (the body) and external space (the cell, the prison, and beyond) can be mobilised to transgress the repressive spatial design and its central components: isolation, immobilisation, and surveillance.’ A method of said transgression which poses a significant challenge to the spatial confinement of imprisonment is the communication between those imprisoned, or to link the prison with the outside world. James Scott writes that when resistance moves from the private realm of the hidden transcript to the public declaration, this encourages a ‘political breakthrough’ challenging the dominant order. However, some of the most effective methods of resistance in defeating dominant order are those which are performed in a private arena.
The prisoners of Robben Island sought to appropriate the prison into the focal site of repression from which to form a widespread and legitimate movement. Whilst South Africa is not unique in the role the prison system played in the political development of the nation as a whole and the individuals within, it is a fitting example in demonstrating how political imprisonment plays a crucial role in influencing resistance movements and their methods.
‘This is an island. Here you will die’ were the words offered to the prisoners upon arrival to Robben Island Prison. Robben Island, a few miles offshore can be seen from any of the heights around Cape Town. During the Apartheid regime, it was considered ‘Purgatory in plain sight’ for those the white regime feared most, such as highly politicised members of the black community. The entire operation of Robben Island Prison was intended to punish and humiliate black leaders who had the audacity to demand equality with whites. Category D political prisoners, the classification assigned to Mandela and other leading black figures, were allowed one thirty minute visit and one letter every six months. However, anything deemed political in the letters would be cut out, often leaving nothing but an indecipherable remnant of paper.
Despite the attempts of the dominant order, the oppressive white warders representing the broader National Party government, to prevent any political activity within the prison, the prisoners collectively used their confinement in order to develop a training ground for young leaders, and a podium from which senior leaders would orate their anti-apartheid message. Prisoners therefore, with the help of their allies outside prison walls were able to transform what Robben Island Prison symbolised in terms of the Apartheid struggle, developing the ideologies as well as the values and practices of the banned South African liberation movements. Their confinement was in some ways transformed into a means of political ‘occupation’, a ‘spatial strategy of disruption’ albeit with a system of leadership.
Prisoner resistance on Robben Island resonates with Foucault’s emphasis on knowledge as power, with their knowledge the imperative form of power in order to challenge the prison system, the broader Apartheid regime and the laws associated with it. However, the understanding of power and resistance by the prisoners, and their realisation of the necessity for social arrangements to successfully organise power and society, contrasts with the position held by Foucault. Foucault instead wished to expose and reject disciplinary mechanisms and the exclusionary consequences that result from the operation of power, believing that ‘to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system.’ The manner in which resistance differs from power in Foucault’s view is the lack of hierarchy, ‘establishing horizontal conjunctions’, which is the primary disparity in approach by Foucault and the prisoners of Robben Island. Foucault recognised the potential of resistance to use and become power, though denied the need for structure or a method of governance in order to achieve such ends. By way of comparison, Robben Island’s prisoners believed that to effectively resist the oppressive National Party enforced regime, meant to eventually engage power. The prisoners shared the train of thought expressed by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau insofar as it is necessary to sacrifice some power to a system of collective power in order to successfully organise society for the common good.
It can be argued that the difference in ideology between the prisoners of Robben Island and Foucault represents a limit in Foucault’s writings on resistance, and the belief that it must be non-hierarchical. In having a strong ideology, using organisational hierarchies and embracing what power they had led the prisoners to mount a successful challenge against a repressive Apartheid regime and be recognised globally as a legitimate organisation capable of holding governmental positions – an aim eventually achieved in 1994, marking the end of the Apartheid era.
A recent act of resistance, with the theme of race again at its core, has been the Ferguson Riots in Missouri, USA. A notable difference in the methods used to counter the conduct of the dominant power in this instance has been the lack of organisational structure.
The Ferguson Riots (‘the Riots’)
In South Carolina, 1944, 14 year old George Stinney Jr. was so small at his execution, that a phone book was placed beneath him upon the electric chair; the death mask too large for his teen face. Interviewed by police without his parents or a lawyer present, Stinney admitted to the murders of two white girls, aged 7 and 11, in what was apparently a coerced confession. Forced confessions are often extracted under torture, racism and prosecutorial misconduct, and means the risk of an innocent person being executed is extremely high. On December 18, 2014, a judge ruled that Stinney was wrongly executed.
Instances of institutionalised racism remain in the United States some seventy years after the execution of George Stinney Jr. Ferguson, a suburb of St. Louis, Missouri, USA, has been in a state of mourning and violence following the death of Michael Brown Jr. on August 9, 2014. 18 year old Brown was shot six times and killed by a white policeman, Darren Wilson. Following the shooting, each day begins with peaceful protests which eventually degenerate into chaos, with cars set alight and overturned, shops looted, with police attempting to control disorder using teargas, flash grenades and rubber bullets against the protesters. I do not wish to dwell on the events that surround the shooting of Brown, but rather look at the rioters and see how their motive compares to the resistance exhibited by the Robben Island prisoners and whether the resistance demonstrated in each instance can be considered revolutionary.
Riots suggest a degree of spontaneity, ‘an unprecedented and innovative type of resistance and revolt’ where the ‘timing is unpredictable but their occurrence is certain.’ This spontaneity is the most notable difference between those engaging in the Riots and the Robben Island prisoners, and is a direct result of a lack of hierarchy or command organising the movement.
Drawing parallels between the movements however, is the way in which they misuse urban space, a means of disciplinary space, demonstrating an attempt at resisting being governed and oppressed. What is at first glance considered ‘mindless’ often ‘criminal behaviour’ can from a different perspective be considered calculated protest. Riots are often judged as having a lack of ideology, though can the rioters of Ferguson be said to lack an agenda? The Ferguson Riots mirror those in Los Angeles in 1992 following the beating of Rodney King. The core message remains the same: institutionalised racism exists and is prevalent in the United States. By blatantly challenging what is considered law-abiding behaviour, those involved are actively protesting against police power, a form of disciplinary power; the abuse of which ultimately caused said riots. To separate looting and the setting of cars alight from the underlying theme of resentment for institutionalised power and racial tensions, not only ignores the problem, but encourages further tension.
Foucault rejects the literature of Marx in describing revolution not as a class struggle between antagonistic classes, but an example of modern power that is pluralistic existing throughout all echelons of society; ‘there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.’ The manner in which the Robben Island prisoners made the Prison a highly politicised centre from which to lead the anti-Apartheid movement was revolutionary insofar as it represented the ‘collective will’ of the prisoners and wider black demographic, and their ‘desire for radical change in ordinary life.’ These features of a revolution were identified by Foucault in his writings regarding the Iranian Revolution. How though, in revolutionary terms does the Ferguson Riots compare to the Robben Island prisoners, the Iranian Revolution, or other ‘historical riots’?
The Ferguson Riots undoubtedly represent the ‘collective will’ of the black community and their desire for a racially colour-blind society, but what separates a victorious historical moment from an attempt at societal change is that those involved ‘won’ what it was they wished to achieve. Though unlike the riots in London in 2011, where main disturbances lasted less than a week, the rioters of Ferguson remain energetic months after the shooting of Michael Brown. The riots have in fact intensified spreading across the US, encouraged by the decision of grand juries not to indict the police officers responsible for killing of black men In Ferguson, Missouri, and Staten Island, New York. Through the rhetoric “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot!”, the movement is explicitly demonstrating its disdain and desire to overcome institutionalised racism. The movement is a refusal of racialised government tactics as conducting power – police power, the power of councils to evict, the power of the legislature and judiciary to issue penalties. Despite Obama having ‘no sympathy’ for the rioters, they’re agenda surpasses mindless violence, but is also political.
My analysis of the power/law relationship in light of the works of Michel Foucault has left me in a state of limbo when considering how far I agree with what is contended in each of his works. Power is indeed everywhere, and through disciplinary and biopowers the remit of the law has receded; though not in its entirety. Law is a fundamental cornerstone of modern society, and is best looked at when considered to work in tandem with disciplinary powers rather than a relationship of conflicting forces. The notion of biopower cleverly generates a web between the societal networks of law, government, politics, policing, and financial institutions and supports the belief that the law is undoubtedly concerned with power. Law and its association with power has, however, the unfortunate ability to allow a dominant state to threaten the existence of life it sees a threat to societal order, as is made evident by the analysis of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, and the institutionalised racism that occurs in the United States.
In answering whether or not it is possible to resist the law, this encouraged the analysis of resistance in two distinct forms: the resistance of a movement with an identifiable ideology, hierarchy and strategy, and a movement which lacks each of the preceding criteria. The current revolt throughout the United States, encouraged by the initial riots in Ferguson, Missouri has the support of leading civil rights activists but lacks any official hierarchy, and as such supports Foucault’s belief that resistance does not require a structure or a method of governance to reach its desired ends. Though in lacking any ideology expressing collective desired ends, this makes said ends more difficult to achieve, and often results in a movement’s disenfranchisement from society. Peaceful protest is often a luxury afforded only to those already in the mainstream, who can be assured their voices will be heard without the need for violence, and who can afford to wait for the change they desire. Though to discredit rioting as means of criminal behaviour is naïve as their agenda is often a political means of resistance and consequently a way in which society can resist law. Though, in opposition to what Foucault contends, it is equally possible to resist the law by forming a hierarchical self-governing movement in the hope of resisting the law, oppressive or not, as evidenced by the prisoners of Robben Island Prison and the wider anti-apartheid movement led by the ANC.
Power’s omnipresence in society results in its association with the law, and equally society’s ability to resist the law with what power it retains against the state.
Buntman F, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid, (Cambridge 2003) 269
Douzinas C, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press: London 2013) 8
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Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing 2010) 3
Foucault M, ‘Iran: The Spirit of a World Without Spirit’ in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984 (D Kritzman, ed; A Sheridan, trs) (Routledge: London 1990) 211-224
Foucault M, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will To Knowledge (R Hurley, trans) (Penguin: London 1998) 83
Golder B and Fitzpatrick P, Fouault’s Law, (Routledge 2009) 131
Gready P, Writing As Resistance (Lexington 2003) 86
Hirst P, Law, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge 2010) 49
Shepherd N and Murray N, ‘Introduction: Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City’ in Nick Shepherd and Noeleen Murray (eds.) Desire Lines (Routledge 2007) 5
Feder E, ‘The Dangerous Individual(‘s) Mother: Biopower, Family, and the Production of Race’  Hypatia 60, 61
Foucault M, ‘The Subject And Power’  Crit. Inq. 777, 777
Hobart M, ‘Michel Foucault and Anthropology’  RAIN 4, 5
Mirzoeff N, ‘The Sea and the Land: Biopower and Visuality from Slavery to Katrina’  Culture, Theory & Critique 289, 290
Turkel G, ‘Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge’  J.Law & Soc. 170, 170
Wickham G, ‘Foucault, Law and Power: A Reassessment’  J.Law & Soc. 596, 601
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Websites and Blogs:
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Jones L, ‘How ‘Hands Up, Don’t Shoot’ Could Start a Real Revolution’ (Time.com 2014) <http://time.com/3618295/eric-garner-ferguson-hands-up-dont-shoot/> accessed 07/01/15
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Droit RP, Interview with Michel Foucault (April 1975)
 C Falzon and T O’Leary, ‘Introduction: Foucault’s Philosophy’ in C Falzon and T O’Leary (eds) Foucault and Philosophy (Blackwell Publishing 2010) 3
 ‘Michel Foucault – A Bibliography’ (egs.edu) <http://www.egs.edu/library/michel-foucault/biography/> accessed 08/12/2014
 M Foucault, ‘The Subject And Power’  Crit. Inq. 777, 777
 Roger-Pol Droit, Interview with Michel Foucault (April 1975)
 Foucault (n3) 778
 M Hobart, ‘Michel Foucault and Anthropology’  RAIN 4, 5
 ‘law’ Oxford Dictionary of English (3rd edn, OUP 2010)
 B Golder and P Fitzpatrick, Fouault’s Law, (Routledge 2009) 131
 ibid. 2
 P Hirst, Law, Socialism and Democracy (Routledge 2010) 49
 M Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will To Knowledge (R Hurley, trans) (Penguin: London 1998) 83
 ibid. 85
 Golder and Fitzpatrick (n8) 16
 G Wickham, ‘Foucault, Law and Power: A Reassessment’  J.Law & Soc. 596, 601
 G Turkel, ‘Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge’  J.Law & Soc. 170, 170
 Golder and Fitzpatrick (n8) 64
 B Sokhi-Bulley, ‘Counter Conduct or Resistance? The Disciplining of Dissent in the Riot City of London’ (2013) QUB, School of Law Research Paper No. 2014-07 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434043> accessed 16/12/14
 Foucault (n11) 95
 F Buntman, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid, (Cambridge 2003) 269
 E Feder, ‘The Dangerous Individual(‘s) Mother: Biopower, Family, and the Production of Race’  Hypatia 60, 61
 Foucault (n3) 790
 Feder (n20) 61
 Feder (n20) 64
 N Mirzoeff, ‘The Sea and the Land: Biopower and Visuality from Slavery to Katrina’  Culture, Theory & Critique 289, 290
 Nick Shepherd and Noeleen Murray, ‘Introduction: Space, Memory and Identity in the Post-apartheid City’ in Nick Shepherd and Noeleen Murray (eds.) Desire Lines (Routledge 2007) 5
 U Davis-Sulikowski, ‘Racism Embodied in Space or Materialization of Apartheid’ (academia.edu 2013) <http://www.academia.edu/5443604/Racism_Embodied_in_Space_or_Materialization_of_Apartheid> accessed 16/12/14
 P Gready, Writing As Resistance (Lexington 2003) 86
 Buntman (n19) 267
 Buntman (n19) 2
 Raymond Whitaker, ‘Mandela’s prison: ‘This is an island. Here you will die.’’ The Independent (London 10 December 2013) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mandelas-prison-this-is-an-island-here-you-will-die-8996418.html> accessed 17/12/14
 Buntman (n19) 268
 J Pickerill and K Krinsky in B Sokhi-Bulley, ‘Counter Conduct or Resistance? The Disciplining of Dissent in the Riot City of London’ (2013) QUB, School of Law Research Paper No. 2014-07 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434043> accessed 16/12/14
 Foucault (n11) 95
 Buntman (n19) 270
 L Lord-Jones, ‘South Carolina Executed a Black 14-Year-Old in 1944 – Now He’s Been Exonerated’ (news.vice.com 2014) <https://news.vice.com/article/a-great-injustice-the-black-14-yer-old-electrocuted-70-years-ago-is-exonerated?> accessed 18/12/14
 C Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis (Polity Press: London 2013) 8
 Douzinas in B Sokhi-Bulley, ‘Counter Conduct or Resistance? The Disciplining of Dissent in the Riot City of London’ (2013) QUB, School of Law Research Paper No. 2014-07 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2434043> accessed 06/01/15
 Foucault (n11) 95
 M Foucault, ‘Iran: The Spirit of a World Without Spirit’ in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984 (D Kritzman, ed; A Sheridan, trs) (Routledge: London 1990) 211-224
 Sokhi-Bulley (n17)
 D Cunha, ‘Ferguson: In defence of rioting’ (Time.com 2014) <http://time.com/3605606/ferguson-in-defense-of-rioting/> accessed 07/01/15